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Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection
Carl Tobias*
The inauguration of President Bill Clinton, who will
appoint more than three hundred new federal judges, affords
an auspicious occasion for rethinking the process of federal
judicial selection. Appointing federal judges is one of the
President's most significant responsibilities, because Article III
judges enjoy life tenure and resolve disputes that implicate
Americans' fundamental freedoms. The selection process,
especially for choosing Supreme Court Justices, has become
increasingly contentious and decreasingly substantive. High
Court nominees have included "stealth" candidates and judges
who have carefully recited a standard litany, regarding issues
such as the right of privacy, which they believed the Senate
Judiciary Committee wanted to hear. The confirmation
proceedings of Justice Clarence Thomas were symptomatic and
even plumbed new depths. Senate hearings for nearly all
circuit and district court nominees have correspondingly lacked
substance, although their ostensible purpose is to scrutinize the
candidates' fitness for judicial service.
The current federal bench, two-thirds of whose members
were appointed by Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush,
reflects increased conservatism and is quite homogeneous in
terms of race, gender, and political perspectives. For instance,
President Reagan appointed a dramatically smaller, and
President Bush named a substantially lower, percentage of
African-Americans than did President Jimmy Carter. The
Republican chief executives made these appointments although
they had much larger, more experienced, pools of female and
minority attorneys from which to select judges.

* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Mark
Gitenstein, Melissa Harrison, Rob Natelson, Peggy Sanner and Tammy Wyatt-Shaw
for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing
this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that
remain are mine.
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The substantive decisionmaking of many Republican
appointees also manifests conservatism. For example, the
judges have restrictively interpreted the Constitution and
congressional legislation, have limited federal court access, and
have narrowly viewed the rights of individuals accused of
crime. The Republican Presidents, accordingly, achieved their
expressly stated objective of creating a more conservative
judiciary, even though they arguably exceeded popular
consensus in appointing judges. The factors above have
apparently increased public cynicism about judicial selection
and may have eroded respect for the federal courts.
All of these considerations, particularly the advent of a
new administration and growing disillusionment with the
process of choosing judges, make the present a propitious time
to reconsider selection. 'I'his Article undertakes that effort. The
.Article first examines how Presidents Carter, Reagan and Bush
named judges. It assesses the goals articulated, the procedures
employed, the judges confirmed, and the decisional records of
those appointed. Because this evaluation finds that the
processes for choosing judges were problematic, it concludes
with suggestions for improving federal judicial selection.
I. THE RECENT HISTORY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION

The judicial selection policies enunciated, the procedures
followed, the judges named, and their decisionmaking during
the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations warrant
considerable treatment here, although other observers have
explored these phenomena. 1 Numerous aspects of this history
are important to understanding recent developments involving
judicial selection and the recommendations presented in Part II
of the Article; those features will be emphasized in this Part.

1. See, e.g., Charles M. Mathias, Jr., Advice and Consent: The Role of the
United States Senate in the JrMiicial Selection Process, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 200
(1987); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the
Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1502-12 (1992); Carl Tobias, The Gender
Gap on the Federal Bench, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 172-76 (1990); cf. W. Gary
Fowler, A Comparison of Initial Recommendation Procedures: Judicial Selection
Under Reagan and Carter, 1 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 299, 301-06 (1983) (pre-1975
history); Strauss & Sunstein, supra, at 1494-1502 (same). See generally MARK H.
GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE (1992); DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE

(1988).
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A. The Carter Administration
President Carter had a clear, strong commitment to improving the federal judiciary, which he pursued in a number of
ways. 2 The President believed that reduced reliance on traditional procedures, such as patronage and senatorial courtesy,
the concomitant opening of the selection process to broader
public participation, and the creation of a larger, more diverse
pool of potential candidates would foster the appointment of
better judges.3 Nominating commissions were instrumentalities integral to these phenomena, and the Carter administration employed the panels for both appellate and district
courts.4
An important dimension of President Carter's judicial selection policy was his determination to place substantially
increased numbers of women and minorities on the federal
bench. 5 When the Carter administration assumed office, there
were only two African-Americans and one woman among the
ninety-seven appeals court judges and only twenty AfricanAmericans or Latinos and five women among the 400 district
court judges.6
President Carter created the United States Circuit Judge
Nominating Commission to recommend lawyers for appointment to the federal appellate courts. 7 The Carter administra-

2. I rely substantially in this subsection on Elliot E. Slotnick, Lowering the
Bench or Raising It Higher?: Affirmatiue Action and Judicial Selection During the
Carter Administration, 1 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 270 (1983), and on numerous articles in Judicature magazine, such as those in the issue titled Federal Judicial
Selection: The Problems and Achievements of Carter's Merit Plan, 62 JUDICATURE
463-510 (1979).
3. See Fowler, supra note 1, at 307-09, 331; see also Slotnick, supra note 2,
at 296-98; cf. O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 49-80 (discussing patronage and senatorial

courtesy).
4. See LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT
JUDGE NOJ\fiNATING COMMISSION: !TS MEJ\ffiERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES
(1980); ALAN NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOJ\fiNATING COMMISSIONS: THEIR MEJ\ffiERS, PROCEDURES, AND CANDIDATES (1981).
5. See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 1, at 299-300, 307-09; Elliot E. Slotnick,
Gender, Affirmative Action, and Recruitment to the Federal Bench, 14 GoLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 519, 530-35 (1984); Slotnick, supra note 2, at 271-77.
6. See Robert J. Lipshutz & Douglas B. Huron, Achieving a More Representative Federal Judiciary, 62 JUDICATURE 483 (1979); see also Slotnick, supra note 2,
at 271. See generally Elaine Martin, Women on the Federal Bench: A Comparatiue
Profile, 65 JUDICATURE 306 (1982).
7. See Lipshutz & Huron, supra note 6, at 484; Elaine Martin, Gender and
Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the Reagan and Carter Administrations, 71
JUDICATURE 136, 140 (1987). See generally BERKSON & CARBON, supra note 4.

1260 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1993
tion established merit selection panels in each circuit to suggest possible nominees when vacancies occurred, asking the
panels to search for, find, recommend, and promote the candidacies of highly-qualified female and minority attorneys. In
May 1978, President Carter encouraged all of these panels "to
make special efforts to seek out and identify well qualified
women and members of minority groups as potential nominees."8
With the 1978 passage of the Omnibus Judgeships Act
creating 152 new judicial seats, the President intensified his
efforts to make the ')udiciary more fully representative of our
population"9 and requested that senators work with him to
attain this goal. President Carter issued an Executive Order
which asked that nominating commissions be created to suggest district court nominees and which directed the Attorney
General to ascertain whether the panels had affirmatively
attempted to "identify qualified candidates, including women
and members of minority groups" before forwarding names to
the President. 10
Because President Carter was dissatisfied with the early
results of these endeavors, he wrote the panels' chairs and
senators requesting that they redouble their efforts to designate competent female and minority attorneys. 11 lliustrative
of the Carter administration's approach to judicial selection
was the Attorney Geneml's Senate testimony indicating that
the President would appoint qualified women and minorities
even when white male candidates who might be better qualified were under consideration. 12

8. Exec. Order No. 12,059, 3 C.F.R. 180, 182 (1979), noted in 28 U.S.C. § 44
(Supp. 1992), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,305, 3 C.F.R. 150 (1982), noted in 28
U.S.C. § 44 (Supp. 1992). See generally Slotnick, supra note 5, at 530-31.
9. President Jimmy Carter, Law Day Address (May 1, 1978), cited in
Lipshutz & Huron, supra note 6, at 485; see also Omnibus Judgeships Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.). See generally O'BRIEN, mpra note 1, at 58-59.
10. Exec. Order No. 12,0S7, 3 C.F.R. 254, 255 (1979), noted in 28 U.S.C.
§ 133 (Supp. 1993), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,553, 3 C.F.R. 204, 210 (1987),
noted in 28 U.S.C. § 133 (Supp. 1992). See generally NEFF, supra note 4.
11. See Lipshutz & Huron, supra note 6, at 485; cf. Katherine Randall, The
Success of Affirmative Action in the Sixth Circuit, 62 JUDICATURE 486 (1979) (panel
member's description of how panel responded to President's requests); Peter G.
Fish, Merit Selection and Politics: Choosing a Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635 (1979) (panel
member's description of how anc•ther panel functioned).
12. The Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearing Before the
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The Carter administration apparently did not pursue very
specific goals in terms of the political perspectives or judicial
philosophies which nominees would have as federal judges,
although it probably expected that the nominees would share
the President's political viewpoints. 13 President Carter and
those officials responsible for judicial selection could well have
assumed that the administration's appointees, especially women and minorities, would generally be rather "liberal."14
The Carter administration's efforts to name highly qualified attorneys, including women and minorities, proved quite
successful. Indeed, observers have characterized the nominating commissions as the most efficacious technique yet developed for increasing the number of female and minority lawyers
appointed to the bench. 15 The panels, composed of a broad
spectrum of individuals, such as persons who had not participated in traditional politics, were able to identify, recommend,
and champion the candidacies of highly competent attorneys
with whom senators may have been less familiar. 16
Of the 258 judges whom President Carter ultimately appointed during his four-year tenure, there were forty women
(15.5%) and thirty-seven African-Americans (14.3%). 17 The
administration's success in naming very qualified female and
minority lawyers is striking because of the comparatively

Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1979) [hereinafter
Hearings) (statement of Griffin Bell); see also NEFF, supra note 4, at 102; cf. Elliot
E. Slotnick, The Changing Role of the Senate Judiciary Committee in Judicial Selection, 62 JUDICATURE 502, 503 (1979) (alluding to similar testimony).
13. See O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 59-60; Fowler, supra note 1, at 308, 336;
see also NEFF, supra note 4, at 149, 151.
14. One definition of liberalism is a "relative tendency to vote in favor of the
legal claims of the criminally accused and prisoners in criminal and prisoner's
rights cases, and in favor of the legal claims of women and racial minorities in sex
and race discrimination cases respectively." Jon Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence of Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting on
the U.S. Court of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 165, 168 (1983); see also infra notes 1920 and accompanying text.
15. See Martin, supra note 7, at 140-41; see also Tobias, supra note 1, at 174.
See generally BERKSON & CARBON, supra note 4; NEFF, supra note 4. But see infra
notes 21-22, 131 and accompanying text.
16. Cf. Sheldon Goldman, Should There Be Affirmative Action for the Judiciary?, 62 JUDICATURE 488 (1979); Randall, supra note 11. See generally BERKSON &
CARBON, supra note 4; NEFF, supra note 4.
17. See Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle
and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318, 322, 325 (1989); see also Patricia M. Wald,
Women in the Law, TRIAL, Nov. 1988, at 75.
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small, relatively inexperienced, pool of attorneys from which to
select. 18
It is more problematic to ascertain the quality of judicial
service that the Carter appointees have provided. One important reason for this is the difficulty of articulating parameters
which accurately measure quality. Certain criteria have strong
political connotations. For instance, the judges whom President
Carter placed on the courts clearly have been more liberal than
those appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush. 19 A somewhat less political example is that the Carter appointees have
been comparatively sensitive to numerous constitutional rights
of individuals; have sought out and implemented congressional
intent in substantive statutes, even when it is not expressed
with blinding clarity; and have afforded relatively expansive
court access to resource-deficient parties, such as civil rights
plaintiffs. 20
More neutral parameters can pose problems of assessment.
For instance, even if evaluators could clearly ascertain when
judges resolved cases faster, it would be difficult to discern
whether those dispositions were fairer, and even more difficult
to draw conclusions about the judges' diligence from that determination. Greater complications attend efforts to measure other important judicial qualities. For example, it is virtually
impossible to assess accurately the integrity, intelligence, independence, and judicial temperament that specific judges have.
The Carter administration's goals and procedures for selecting federal judges, its appointees, and their decisionmaking
have been rather controversial. For instance, conservative commentators and politicians have been critical of the Carter selection process,21 and observers have characterized it as "affirma18. For example, there were 62,000 women in the legal profession in 1980
and 140,000 female attorneys in 1988. Telephone Interview with Marena
McPherson, American Bar Association Commission on Women in the Profession
(Nov. 17, 1992); see also infra note 62 and accompanying text. See generally
Slotnick, supra note 5, at 522-25.
19. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying
on a Tradition, 74 JUDICATURE 294, 306 (1991); Goldman, supra note 17, at 328;
Neil A. Lewis, Selection of Conservative Judges Insures a President's Legacy, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 1992, at Al3; cf. Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, Note, All
the President's Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts
of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REV. W6, 779-93 (1987) (finding Reagan appointees not
significantly more conservative than Republican colleagues).
20. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Carter's Judicial Appointments: A La.sting
Legacy, 64 JUDICATURE 344, 355 (1981); see also Goldman, supra note 19, at 306;
infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
21. For general discussions of the criticisms and citations to relevant primary
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tive action" for the judiciary. They have implied that the appointees were less qualified,22 although the criticism seems to
implicate disagreement with the judges' substantive determinations. The decisionmaking of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia specifically troubled many members of Congress when Democratic appointees, including Carter judges,
constituted a majority.23 Indeed, some senators and representatives introduced legislation which would have revamped
traditional notions of venue by dramatically reducing the possibilities for suing in Washington, D.C. 24
Despite these criticisms, many of President Carter's appointees apparently have been better qualified than judges
named through more traditional procedures.25 A number of
the female and minority judges, such as Circuit Judges Amalya
Kearse, Patricia McGowan Wald, and Harry Edwards, have
rendered exceptional judicial service. 26 One study correspondingly found that women and minorities whom President Carter
appointed had to satisfy higher standards for nomination than
did other lawyers and that these female and minority judges
were as qualified as their predecessors in terms of certain significant parameters.27 There are also numerous reasons why

sources, see O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 59; Slotnick, supra note 2, at 274-75; Elliot
E. Slotnick, Reforms in Judicial Selection: Will They Affect the Senate's Role? Part
II, 64 JUDICATURE 114, 117 (1980); see also BERKSON & CARBON, supra note 4, at
183.
22. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 12, pt. 8, at 2-5 (statement of Sen. Harry
F. Byrd); see also Fowler, supra note 1, at 334; Slotnick, supra note 2, at 274-75.
23. See Cass R. Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U.
CHI. L. REV. 976, 979, 999 (1982). See generally Venue Reform: Sue West, Young
Man?, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 10.
24. See, e.g., H.R. 754, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 739, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979). This legislation was dubbed "Sagebrush Venue," because its proponents represented western states. Cf. PAUL LAXALT ET AL., VENUE AT THE CROSSROADS (Steven R. Schlesinger ed., 1982) Oegislative analysis by proponents and
opponents); Lewis, supra note 19 (discussing the much more conservative current
composition of the District of Columbia Circuit); see also Sunstein, supra note 23.
25. This is controversial and may ultimately depend on the definition of
"qualified" employed. See Slotnick, supra note 2, at 298.
26. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 19, at 306 (mentioning Judge Kearse as a
possible Supreme Court nominee). Judge Edwards and Judge Wald have been active participants in scholarly debate even while ably handling the highly complex
cases resolved by the District of Columbia Circuit. See, e.g., Harry Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 34 (1992); Patricia M. Wald, The "New Administrative Law"-With the
Same Old Judges in It?, 1991 DUKE L.J. 647.
27. See Slotnick, supra note 2, at 280-98; cf. Goldman, supra note 16, at 49293 (stating that female and minority Carter appointees on the whole "may even be
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it is important to have the diverse perspectives, especially from
personal life experiences, which many women and minorities
bring to service on the federal bench. 28

B. Republican Administrations
The goals, procedures, and appointees of the Carter administration contrast markedly with those of President Reagan and
President Bush. Moreover, both Republican administrations
followed rather similar processes of judicial selection, relying
on comparatively traditional policies and procedures. Because
these practices have more limited relevance to the suggestions
made in the next section of this Article, the selection processes
of the Republican chief executives, and particularly those of
President Bush, are accorded somewhat less treatment in this
Article.

1. The Reagan administration
President Reagan swept into office in 1981 with what he
claimed was a popular mandate to make the federal government, including the judicial branch, more conservative. 29 The
Chief Executive specifically observed that his primary objective
in choosing judges was to make the courts more conservative.30 President Reagan and his advisers sought out and proposed nominees who they believed subscribed to the President's
judicial philosophy. 31 This meant, for example, that the nominees disagreed with the 'judicial activism" attributed to the
Warren Court, which expansively interpreted the right of privacy, the Equal Protection Clause, and the protections accorded
the criminally accused. 32 President Reagan frequently spoke of
more distinguished than ... white males chosen by Carter and previous administrations").
28. For example, these judges' presence on the bench makes the courts more
representative of society. See also infra notes 101-104 and accompanying text. But
see infra note 104.
29. I rely substantially here on O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 60-64; Goldman,
supra note 17.
30. See, e.g., O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 60; Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Appointments at Mid-term: Shaping the Bench in His Own Image, 66 JUDICATURE 334, 347 (1983).
31. See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 1, at 308; Goldman, supra note 17, at 31920.
32. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (equal protection); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) (protections accorded criminally accused); see also Goldman, supra

1257]

FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION

1265

appointing attorneys who would exercise judicial restraint and
be tough on crime.aa
'l'hese selection policies partly reflected the broader conservative agenda of the Reagan administration and the corresponding view among a number of conservatives that the federal courts were important institutions which had previously
frustrated the attainment of certain conservative social and
political aims, such as restricting abortion and fostering prayer
in public schools.a4 President Reagan's goals concomitantly
responded to the concern that passage of the Omnibus Judgeships Act had facilitated President Carter's appointment of
numerous judges, too many of whom conservatives believed had
overly liberal perspectives.as The Republican Chief Executive
also found judicial appointments to be a relatively cost-free
means of appeasing conservative elements in his political party. as
The Reagan administration sought to achieve its objective
of making the federal judicial bench more conservative in a
number of ways. One approach was a negative response to the
goals and procedures the Carter administration had employed.
Among the initial actions President Reagan took upon assuming office was the revocation of the executive orders governing
selection that his predecessor had issued.a7 President Reagan
correspondingly abolished Carter's Circuit Judge Nominating
Commission and relied substantially less on the district court
nominating panels.as The Reagan administration also undertook virtually none of the special efforts President Carter had

note 17, at 319-20. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPI'ING OF AMERICA 69100 (1990); ARCIIlBALD COX, THE WARREN COURI' (1968).
33. See, e.g., O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 60; Fowler, supra note 1, at 336; cf.
Sheldon Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary: The First Term Appointments, 68
JUDICATURE 312, 328 (1985).
34. See, e.g., Nadine Cohodas, Conservatives Pressing to Reshape Judiciary, 43
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1759, 1759 (1985) (statement of Bruce Fein, former Associate
Deputy Attorney General). See generally O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 61-62.
35. See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 1, at 308; Goldman, supra note 30, at 337
n.2; see also supra note 9.
36. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of Judges Reagan Favored,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1990, at Al; Ruth Marcus, Bush Quietly Fosters Conservative
Trend in Courts, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1991, at A4. See generally O'BRIEN, supra
note 1, at 60-63.
37. See supra notes 8, 10.
38. See supra notes 8, 10; see also O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 61; Fowler,
supra note 1, at 309-10.
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instituted to search for, fmd, and appoint highly qualified women and minorities. 39
President Reagan implicitly rejected other approaches
implemented by the Carter administration.40 He applied selection procedures that were comparatively closed. President Reagan involved relatively few participants in the process, while
the pool of candidates considered, and the nominees actually
appointed, were neither large nor diverse in terms of, for instance, gender, race, or political views. The Chief Executive
concomitantly relied on traditional procedures. Patronage and
senatorial courtesy prominently figured in most judicial appointments. The Reagan administration deferred substantially
to senators who represented geographic areas in which judicial
vacancies occurred and rarely consulted the Senate Judiciary
Committee before nominating candidates.
President Reagan and individuals with responsibility for
judicial selection also employed affirmative approaches to
achieve the administration's goals. Those who recruited candidates implemented President Reagan's policy directive to make
the courts more conservative by diligently searching for lawyers
with appropriate ideological viewpoints and forwarding their
names to the President.
The officials applied a number of techniques to effectuate
this instruction, including several important innovations.41
One innovation was placing substantial responsibility for selection in the Justice Department Office of Legal Policy. The Reagan administration systematized screening procedures, even
instituting the unprecedented practice of having Justice Department employees extensively interview all serious candidates in Washington. 42
Administration personnel also consulted the substantive
decisionmaking of federal circuit and district court judges in

39. See Martin, supra note- 7, at 138-41; Slotnick, supra note 5, at 545-71;
Tobias, supra note 1, at 174. Indeed, President Reagan named only three women
out of eighty-seven judges during his first two years. See Goldman, supra note 17,
at 325.
40. I rely substantially in this paragraph on O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 60-64;
Fowler, supra note 1, at 309-10; Goldman, supra note 17, at 319-20; see also William F. Smith, Attorney Generafs Memorandum on Judicial Selection Procedures
(1981), reprinted in 64 JUDICATURE 428 (1981).
41. I rely substantially in the next three paragraphs on O'BRIEN, supra note
1, at 60-62; Fowler, supra note 1, at 309-10; Goldman, supra note 17, at 319-20.
42. See, e.g., O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 60-62; Goldman, supra note 17, at
319.
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ascertaining their fitness for service on higher courts.43 Some
observers, accordingly, have accused President Reagan of considering ideological propriety, and even of relying on litmus
tests respecting questions such as abortion, in deciding whether
to elevate judges to the next tier in the federal court system. 44
Professor Sheldon Goldman has observed that the Reagan
administration arguably participated in the "most systematic
judicial philosophical screening'' of candidates in the country's
history,45 although he found "no evidence that judicial candidates were asked how they would rule in any case" and concluded that the administration did not apply litmus tests.46
A second significant innovation was the President's Committee on Federal Judicial Selection.47 The counsel to the
President chaired that entity, which included high-ranking
officials in the White House and Justice Department.48 The
committee had great symbolic and pragmatic importance. It
symbolized the significance that President Reagan attached to
control of the selection process as one means of naming judges
who might enable the administration to realize its social agenda. 49 As a practical matter, the committee could analyze candidates and consider philosophical factors and political concerns, such as their support from Republican senators. 50
Another important aspect of President Reagan's approach
to judicial selection was the relative lack of communication
between his administration and the American Bar Association
(ABA) Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary.51 Professor
43. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 36; Tim Weiner, White House Builds Courts in
Its Own Image, PmLA. INQUIRER, Oct. 7, 1990, at A-1.
44. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 36; Weiner, supra note 43. President Reagan
also emphasized prior judicial and prosecutorial experience in considering candidates for district courts. See Martin, supra note 7, at 138-41; see also Goldman,
supra note 17, at 319-20.
45. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 319-20; see also O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at
60-62.
46. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 320; see also Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's
Second Term Judicial Appointments: The Battle at Midway, 70 JUDICATURE 324,
326 (1987).
47. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 320; see also Goldman, supra note 33, at
315. See generally O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 61.
48. See Fowler, supra note 1, at 310; Goldman, supra note 17, at 320;
Goldman, supra note 33, at 315.
49. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 320; see also Goldman, supra note 33, at
315.
50. See O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 61; Goldman, supra note 17, at 320.
51. For discussion of the ABA Committee's role in evaluating nominees, see
AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, THE ABA's STANDING COMMI'ITEE ON FEDERAL JUDI·
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Goldman observed that no prior Republican administration had
maintained such a distant relationship with the committee.s2
He attributed this circumstance to Justice Department dissatisfaction with the committee's system for evaluating nominees, a
regime which often resulted in ratings less favorable than the
administration desired. s3
Republican Party control of the Senate during President
Reagan's first six years in office facilitated the entire appointment process. s4 The Senate Judiciary Committee obviously
had great incentives to approve nominees as rapidly as possible
and to accommodate the administration. The confirmation
proceedings consisted of rather perfunctory hearings in which a
few senators asked nominees unenlightening questions. When
the Democrats recaptured the Senate in the 1986 elections, the
committee processed nominees with less alacrity and the hearings became somewhat more substantive.ss
President Reagan's attempt to place Judge Robert Bork on
the Supreme Court aptly epitomized his administration's judicial selection efforts. ss To solidify a conservative majority on
the Court, the President nominated Judge Bork, who was widely regarded as holding very conservative views on numerous issues of constitutional interpretation.s7 Most senators and
much of the public believed that Judge Bork's perspectives

CIARY: WHAT IT Is AND HOW IT WORKS (1991); O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 81-94; see
also infra notes 82-87, 143-144 and accompanying text.
52. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 320; see also O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at
61:. Goldman, supra note 33, at 316.
53. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 320; see also O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at
61. Because the Carter administration maintained a non-controversial, relatively
traditional relationship with the committee, that relationship was not discussed
above. See generally id. at 58.
54. For discussion of the Senate's role in the appointment process, see
O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 65-80; Elliot E. Slotnick, The Changing Role of the Senate Judiciary Committee in Judicial Selection, 62 JUDICATURE 502 (1979).
55. The difference was minimal-one of degree, not kind. Cf. Fish, supra note
11 (describing rapid processing under Carter administration); Fowler, supra note 1,
at 325-31 (describing similar roles of the Judiciary Committee in Carter and Reagan Administrations); Roger J. Miner, Advice and Consent in Theory and Practice,
41 AM. U. L. REV. 1075, 1081, 1085 (1992) (documenting how the process of nomination and advice and consent has recently "broken down for now and may not be
functioning as the Framers intended" principally because Presidents and senators
have ceded power to stafi).
56. See GITENSTEIN, supra note 1; cf. BORK, supra note 32, at 271-349 (Judge
Bo:rk's account of nomination proceedings).
57. See GITENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 18-54, 76-137, 153-63. But see BORK,
supra note 32, at 69-100, 139-221, 241-65.
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were outside the mainstream of American legal thought, and
the Senate soundly rejected his appointment after an acrimonious battle.58
Despite this defeat, President Reagan ultimately accomplished his explicitly articulated goal. of making the courts
more conservative, although he probably exceeded public consensus. This increased conservatism is seen in the 368 judges
whom President Reagan named. 59 His appointees were very
similar in terms of gender, race, and political viewpoint. African-Americans constituted a mere 1.9% (7 out of 368) of the
attorneys whom President Reagan placed on the courts during
his two terms.so Women comprised only 7% (28 out of 368) of
the judges named.st The tiny numbers and percentages of minorities and women appointed become even more compelling in
light of several salient facts. President Carter named seven
times the percentage of African-Americans and double the
percentage of women, even though he had a substantially
smaller, less experienced pool of minority and female lawyers
on which to draw.s 2
Conservatism can also be witnessed in the judicial determinations of President Reagan's appointees. Many of those judges, once in office, have resolved cases in a conservative manner.
For example, they have narrowly interpreted the Constitution
and congressional legislation, have curtailed federal court access, and have sharply limited the rights of criminal defendants. s3 The Supreme Court has persisted in restrictively
reading much civil rights law, and Congress has responded by
passing numerous civil rights restoration statutes.s4 These·
developments culminated in the disastrous 1988 Term, in
58. See GITENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 76-117, 153-63, 182-249, 267-96. But see
Boru<, supra note 32, at 139-221, 241-343.
59. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 322, 325.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
63. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 328-29; cf. Steve Alumbaugh & C.K
Rowland, The Links Between Platform-Based Appointment Criteria and Trial
Judges' Abortion Judgments, 74 JUDICATURE 153 (1990) (fmding Reagan appointees
far more likely than Carter appointees to resist pro-abortion claims). See generally
O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 60-64.
64. See Roy L. Brooks, Beyond Civil Rights Restoration Legislation: Restructuring Tiae VII, 34 ST. LouIS U. L.J. 551, 552-53 (1990) (recounting Court-Congress point, counterpoint and enumerating restoration acts). See generally William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
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which the Court narrowly applied numerous civil rights
laws. 65 Congress reacted to those rulings by adopting the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.66

2. The Bush administra.tion
The Bush administration's approach to federal judicial
selection warrants less treatment here, because it mirrored in
many respects the process which the Reagan administration
employed. For instance, President Bush expressly subscribed to
the identical major purpose of creating a more conservative
federal judiciary,67 considered judicial appointments a valuaTole means for cultivating conservative components of his political coalition,68 and relied heavily on senatorial courtesy and
patronage. 69
The Bush administiration, however, dissimilarly treated
some aspects of judicial selection. For example, President Bush
assumed a different approach to the Supreme Court nomination process, a response the failed Bork nomination may have
prompted. 70 The President submitted the names of stealth
candidates, a strategy which proved successful with Justice
David Souter.
The administration apparently thought that similar tactics
would lead to Judge Thomas' confirmation. 71 His sparse judi-

65. See, e.g., Martin v. Willes, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See generally Symposium, The United States Supreme Court's 1988 Term Civil Rights Cases, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1351 (1990).
66. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 2 U.S.C.). See generally Carl
Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural Problems, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 801 (1992). Measuring
accurately the quality of appointees' judicial service is problematic. See supra notes
19-20 and accompanying text. F•)r one assessment of the Reagan and Bush appointees, see infra notes 112-117 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 36; Letter from President George Bush to
Senator Robert Dole (Nov. 30, 1990) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Letter);
see also supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 19; Marcus, supra note 36; see also supra note
36 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Gi>ldman, supra note 19, at 295-97; Lewis, supra note 36; see
also supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
71. I rely substantially here on contemporaneous newspaper accounts. See
generally TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL GAMES: CLARENCE
THOMAS, ANITA HILL, AND THE STORY OF A SUPREME COURT NOMINATION (1992);
PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSENT (1992); Symposium, Gender, Race and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments: The Import of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas
Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1992) [hereinafter Symposium).
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cial record contradicted President Bush's assertion that Judge
Thomas was the best possible candidate for the Court. 72 Numerous observers criticized the President for nominating Judge
Thomas because he was an African-American and very conservative, instead of nominating many other African-American
lawyers who possessed greater experience but had more moderate political views. 73
The confirmation proceedings were extremely contentious. 74 The administration and Republican senators chose to
rely substantially on character issues, emphasizing Judge
Thomas' ability to overcome a poverty-stricken background.75
Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee questioned
Judge Thomas' qualifications for service on the Supreme Court
while probing the jurist's philosophy of judging and his views
on constitutional and statutory interpretation. 76 Judge Thomas steadfastly refused to participate in meaningful dialogue regarding anything substantive, behavior which became absurd
when the nominee claimed that he had never seriously considered Roe v. Wade. 77
72. See The Supreme Court; Excerpts from News Conference Announcing Court
Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at A14; see also Leslie H. Gelb, Untruths ... ,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1991, § 4, at 15. Judge Thomas had served on the District of
Columbia Circuit Court for less than eighteen months when President Bush nominated him. See Neil A. Lewis, Panel Backs Appeals Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 1990, at A16.
73. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, October Tragedy, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1497
(1992); Gelb, supra note 72; see also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to
Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1005 (1992); supra note 26.
74. See Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. on the Nomination of
Judge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Thomas Hearings]. See generally
NOMINATION OF CLARENCE THOMAS TO BE AN AsSOCIATE JUsrICE OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COUIIT, S. EXEC. REP. No. 15, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Symposium, supra note 71.
75. See, e.g., Excerpts from Senate's Hearings on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at A22 [hereinafter Thomas Hearings Excerpts] (opening
statement of Clarence Thomas); see also Higginbotham, supra note 73, at 1026. See
generally GITENsrEIN, supra note 1, at 323-46.
76. See, e.g., Thomas Hearings Excerpts, supra note 75 (statements of Sen.
Biden and Sen. Kennedy); The Thomas Hearings; Excerpts from Senate's Hearings
on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at A20 (statements of Sen.
Leahy and Sen. Metzenbaum).
77. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The process degenerated into a public spectacle in
which Professor Anita Hill accused Judge Thomas of sexual harassment and he
responded with allegations of a "hi-tech lynching." The senators, for their part,
ineptly handled the matter. They asked vacuous and misleading questions under
the glare of television lights as millions of viewers were simultaneously captivated
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The Bush administration departed in other ways from
President Reagan's approach to judicial selection. For instance,
President Bush stated that he sought to appoint judges who
would interpret the law, :not ''legislat[e] from the bench," thereby modifying somewhat President Reagan's formulation. 78
Moreover, the Bush administration centralized responsibility in
the office of White House Counsel, C. Boyden Gray, which
partially reduced Justic·e Department participation. 79 President Bush also undertook greater efforts to seek out and nominate highly qualified women and minorities, although his administration only did so after two years in office and these
endeavors were less thorough than President Carter's efforts. 80 The Bush administration did not scrutinize judicial
candidates' political philosophies as systematically as the Reagan administration,. but it had little need to analyze closely
those Reagan district court appointees who constituted a substantial percentage of President Bush's appellate court nominees.81
Another way that the Reagan and Bush administrations
differed was their relationships with the ABA Standing Committee on Judiciary. 82 During President Bush's tenure, relations with the committee deteriorated even more. Attorney
General Richard Thombmgh requested that the ABA disavow
consideration of nominees' ideological or political perspectives
in evaluating them. 83 The ABA responded that it only examined those views when they became relevant to nominees' qualifications, such as integrity, competence, and judicial tempera-

and repelled by the bizarre public display. See also Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at
1503; Gelb, supra note 72. See generally RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER:
ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL
REALITY (Toni Morrison ed., 1992); Symposium, supra note 71.
78. See, e.g., Bush v. Clinton: The Candidates on Legal Issues, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1992, at 57 [hereinafter Bush v. Clinton]; The Candidates Respond, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1988, at 52, 57; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76
JUDICATURE 282, 285, 296 (1993); Goldman, supra note 19, at 297; Miner, supra
note 55, at 1080.
80. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 19, at 297; Letter, supra note 67; see also
supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 36; Marcus, supra note 36; see also Goldman,
supra note 19, at 294; supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
82. I rely substantially here on Goldman, supra note 19. See also supra notes
51-53 and accompanying text.
83. See Goldman, supra note 19, at 295.
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ment. 84 The Attorney General found the Association's explanation inadequate, stating that it jeopardized committee involvement in the nomination process. 85 The Attorney General and
the committee eventually reached an agreement in which the
ABA expressly disavowed any consideration of ideological or
political perspectives in the rating process, and the committee
reassumed responsibility for reviewing nominees' qualifications. 86 Nonetheless, Fresident Bush recently expressed lingering concerns about the committee's objectivity,87 thus indicating that the dispute was not satisfactorily resolved.
The Bush administration ultimately realized the goal of
making the federal courts more conservative, even though it
lacked a clear popular mandate to do so, as the stormy proceedings to confirm Justice Thomas .demonstrate.88 Certain evidence suggests, however, that Bush appointees are somewhat
less doctrinaire than those of President Reagan. 89 An important example is Justice Souter, whose moderate voting record
on a number of constitutional issues has led writers to classify
him as one member of a new centrist coalition which includes
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Justice Anthony Kennedy. 90
President Bush's appointees were also more diverse in
terms of gender and race. Women comprised 18.7% (36 out of
192) of the judges whom he selected, while African-Americans
constituted 5.2% (10 out of 192).91 The Bush administration
also named the youngest judges in American history, which

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.; cf. Charles E. Anderson, Thornburgh on the Record, A.B.A. J., Jan.
1991, at 56 (attributing controversy to ABA!s adoption of resolution favoring abortion rights); see also Marianne Lavelle, ... And Role of the ABA, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
6, 1990, at 43.
87. See Bush v. Clinton, supra note 78, at 58.
88. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 19, at 295-98; Lewis, supra note 19. But
see Bill Clinton, Judiciary Suffers Racial, Sexual Lack of Balance, NAT'L L.J., Nov.
2, 1992, at 15.
90. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992) (joining Court's opinion with Justices O'Connor and Kennedy); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2146 (1992) (concurring with Justice Kennedy); see also
Scott P. Johnson & Christopher E. Smith, David Souter's First Term on the Supreme Court: The Impact of a New Justice, 75 JUDICATURE 238 (1992). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 27-34 (1992).
91. Telephone Interview with George Kassouf, Alliance for Justice, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 2, 1992).
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means that its appointees will continue to have influence well
into the twenty-first century. 92
In sum, this examination of judicial selection under the
administrations of Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Bush illustrates that the process has been problematic in numerous
ways. The assessment also finds that the public has become
increasingly disenchanted with the selection process. The next
s13ction, accordingly, offers suggestions which draw substantially on the most efficacious techniques employed by previous
administrations, Democratic and Republican. 93
II. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

A. Judicial Selection Goals
1.

Selecting judges based on merit

Merit is the goal which should animate the new
administration's policy of federal judicial selection. President
Clinton must appoint only those attorneys who will be excellent
judges. Nominees should be distinguished lawyers with superb
qualifications. For instaince, the attorneys must have been
involved in extremely rigorous legal activity, although the
work's challenging character is more important than its precise
form. 94 Nominees should also be highly intelligent and very
industrious while evidencing balanced dispositions. For example, the lawyers must have the type of broad intellect, willingness to labor vigorously, and appropriately measured judicial
temperament that will enable them to discharge properly the
federal courts' significant responsibilities, implicating such

92. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 89; Lewis, supra note 19.
93. The suggestions are meant to be rather idealistic but are tempered by
certain pragmatic and political realities. For instance, the recommendations suggest
the de-emphasis of senatorial patronage and courtesy while calling for senators to
retain substantial responsibility in judicial selection. See infra notes 131-132 and
accompanying text. This recognizes the potential for senatorial influence to undermine merit while acknowledging that senators can make helpful contributions, will
resist ceding one of the last vestiges of pure patronage, and are essential to President Clinton's achievement of other goals, especially economic ones. The suggestions
also assume that the traditional lower court confirmation process will change minimally, given the 100 vacant seats; other priorities, such as the economy and foreign policy initiatives; and the level of interest and resources that senators will
devote to selection. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, More Women Named Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L.
REV. 477, 485 (1991); Tobias, supra note 1, at 181; see also infra note 123 and
accompanying text.
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issues as the death penalty and abortion. Nominees should
possess additional qualities which are less easily described but
that are essential to superior judicial service. These include
impeccable integrity and substantial independence. In short,
merit must be the touchstone of selection.
It is important at this particular juncture that the administration name the finest judges. Some observers have declared
that the federal judiciary is in crisis, beleaguered by such phenomena as the litigation explosion, litigation abuse, increasingly complicated civil lawsuits, and an expanding criminal docket
primarily attributable to the war on drugs. 95 Although these
propositions are controversial,96 there is widespread agreement that the federal courts constitute a scarce public resource.97 The Supreme Court and Congress have also enlarged
district judges' discretion through procedural changes, such as
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and more
deferential appellate review. 98 The above considerations mean
that President Clinton must appoint judges who can resolve
cases efficiently, fairly, and correctly while exercising their
significant discretion in ways which strike the appropriate
balance between expeditious and just disposition.

2. Creating balance
Although the new administration probably ought to treat
merit as paramount, it should also seriously consider other
factors that could serve as goals. An important example is the
enhancement of balance, in terms of gender, racial diversity,
and political perspectives, on the federal courts.

95. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 416, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 6-32 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.AN. 6803, 6808-35; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COUR'rS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985). See generally FEDERAL COUR'rS STuDY COMMI'ITEE, WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMl\U'ITEE REPOR'rS (1990).
96. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, the Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 921; Lauren K. Robel, The
Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 115 (1991).
See generally Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 288-89 (1989).
97. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 95; Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System
in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1, 2-9 (1990); Robel, supra note 96.
98. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 16; Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.
384, 405 (1990). See generally Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837 (1984);
Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil
Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933 (1991).
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The administration can simultaneously attain these goals
of merit and balance, primarily because they are compatible.
For instance, the large, highly qualified pool of female and
minority attorneys that presently exists makes it possible to
increase merit, diversity~ and political balance on the federal
bench. 99 Balance, therefore, warrants additional exploration.
a. Gender and racial diversity. The administration could
consult the current composition of the federal judiciary, asking
whether the courts should be differently constituted along the
lines of gender, race, or political viewpoints. Enhanced gender
and racial diversity are significant factors that candidate
Clinton promised his administration would closely consider.100 For example, President Clinton might enlarge the numbers of female and African-American judges.
There are several important reasons why the country
needs the diverse viewpoints which many women and minorities bring to judicial service. For instance, most female judges
can more easily appreciate specific difficulties, such as securing
jobs, balancing employment and familial responsibilities, and
encountering gender discrimination, that numerous women
face. 101 Female and minority judges could also heighten the
courts' sensitivity to the increasingly complex issues of public
policy which must be resolved. These questions include allocation of scarce resources and affirmative action. 102 Some evidence correspondingly suggests that many citizens, such as
poverty-stricken individuals, have greater confidence in a federal judiciary which more closely approximates the gender and
racial composition of American society. 103 The appointment of
additional women and minorities might also enhance political

99. Nominees' meritorious qualifications and the quality of judicial service
that appointees render are similar, but not identical, concepts. For instance, meritorious qualifications are not a guarantee of excellent service, but they are strong
indicators. See supra notes 19-20, 25-27, 66 and accompanying text; infra notes
112-117 and accompanying text.
100. See Bush v. Clinton, supra note 78, at 57-58; Clinton, supra note 89.
101. See, e.g., Marion Z. Goldberg, Carter-Appointed Judges: Perspectives on
Gender, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 108; Elaine Martin, Men and Women on the Bench:
Vit•e la Difference?, 73 JUDICATURE 204, 204 (1990). See generally Judith S. Kaye,
Women Lawyers in Big Firms: A Study in Progress Toward Gender Equality, 57
FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 122-26 (1988).
102. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 16, at 494; Slotnick, supra note 2, at 27273.
103. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, A Profile of Cart.er's Judicial Nominees, 62
JUDICATURE 246, 253 (1978); cf. Bush v. Clinton, supra note 78, at 57-58 (similar
suggestion by candidate Clinton); Clinton, supra note 89 (same).
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balance, because they will have more moderate political perspectives than most Reagan and Bush appointees. 104
b. Political balance. The administration, when consulting the existing composition of the federal bench, could ask
whether the judiciary should be differently comprised in terms
of its political views. Greater political balance is an important
factor which candidate Clinton intimated he would examine.105 His administration might consider how candidates as
judges would resolve numerous substantive issues. For instance, President Clinton could nominate attorneys who would
provide broad citizen access to the courts; interpret enactments
in a manner sympathetic to congressional intent, recognizing
the difficulties of legislating with blinding clarity for every
contingency; and expansively regard individual constitutional
rights.106
The interrelated propositions respecting court access and
statutory interpretation are justifiable, because the administration and the Senate can properly attempt to insure that the
nominees proposed, and the judges confirmed, will be solicitous
of congressional intent expressed in the substantive legislation
that Congress has passed and that the Executive Branch must
enforce. 107 The idea as to constitutional rights is a rather con-

104. Several of these concepts may be overstated or crudely instrumental, as
two prominent Republican appointees illustrate. Supreme Court Justice Clarence
Thomas and Circuit Judge Edith Jones have been very conservative judges, evidencing little empathy for individuals accused of crime or who pursue post-conviction relief. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1004 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (evincing little sympathy in Eighth Amendment case for inmate who
was badly beaten); Tobias, supra note 1, at 179-80 (discussing display by Judge
Jones of problematic judicial temperament in death row appeals).
105. See Bush v. Clinton, supra note 78, at 57-58; Clinton, supra note 89.
106. I am not advocating that he do so, because this activity could be characterized as using litmus tests that liberals accused President Reagan of employing
and because it is no more appropriate for Democrats than Republicans to treat
judicial appointments as a means of courting political constituencies. See supra
notes 36, 43-44, 68 and accompanying text; infra note 120. Candidate Clinton
promised to appoint only judges "who believe in ... the right to choose" abortion.
See Joan Biskupic, Court Vacancies Await President, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1992, at
Al. Use of litmus tests is inadvisable, and President Clinton should clearly state
that his administration will not employ them.
107. For example, Senator Grassley has attempted to protect senatorial prerogatives by questioning recent Supreme Court nominees on their views of statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-69 (1986) (discussion between Sen. Grassley and Judge Scalia); Thomas Hearings, supra note 74, at 65-68,
177-502 (statements of Sen. Grassley and Judge Thomas); see also Carl Tobias,
Examining Thomas' Ideas on Statutory Analysis, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 9, 1991, at
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t:roversial, but extremely legitimate, view of the courts' role,
which finds substantial support in much jurisprudence of the
Vvarren Court. 108

B. Additional Justifications for the Goals of Merit and
Balance: The Republican Administrations' Record
Additional propositions support treating merit and balance
as important goals. Most significant is the record of judicial
selection that the Republican administrations compiled over a
twelve-year time frame in which they appointed two-thirds of
the present federal bench. 109 During this period, the Republican chief executives exceeded popular consensus in nominating
conservative Supreme Court candidates. President Reagan
chose most, and President Bush selected many, of the circuit
and district court judges principally because the appointees had
conservative political and philosophical perspectives and would
placate conservative elements in the Republican Party. Of the
judges named, African-Americans constituted less than two
percent of President Reagan's appointees, and only five percent
of President Bush's. 110 The substantive decisionmaking of
these Republican appointees has been conservative; the judges
have narrowly interpreted individuals' constitutional rights and
congressional statutes while limiting federal court access. 111
Although President Reagan clearly, and President Bush
apparently, elevated conservative political factors over merit,
ascertaining whether their appointments actually eroded the
bench's quality is problematic. 112 It is fair to surmise, howev33. See generally Carl Tobias, faterspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L.
REV. 359, 402-05 (1989) (tracing historical development of view that courts should
be solicitous of congressional intent); Robert F. Williams, Statutes As Sources of
Law Beyond Their Terms in Common-Law Cases, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 558
(1982) (same).
108. See Cox, supra note 32. But see Bomc, supra note 32; cf. RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGIITS SERIOUSLY (1977) (eloquent theoretical rendition of argument).
109. See supra notes 29-92 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 60, 91 and accompanying text. The Bush administration
named a higher percentage of women than President Carter, although it had a
substantially larger, more qualified, pool. See supra notes 62, 91 and accompanying
te:ct. One explanation for the dearth of African-American appointees may be that
the Republican Presidents could find no more African-Americans whom they considered sufficiently conservative. See Dan Trigoboff, Bush Judicial Nominees Blasted,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1991, at 20; see also supra note 73; cf. Bush v. Clinton, supra note
78, at 57-58.
111. See supra notes 63-66, 88-90 and accompanying text.
112. The debate over quality here resembles that above. See supra notes 19-28
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er, that the chief executives' nearly single-minded pursuit of
conservative ideology sacrificed other important attributes,
including competence, and could have diluted the courts' quality. Even conservative commentators have criticized Presidents
Reagan and Bush for naming mediocre Supreme Court Justices. 113
The controversy over Daniel Manion's fitness to serve on
the Seventh Circuit additionally supports these ideas. 114 During the 1980s, Democratic senators became increasingly frustrated with President Reagan's nominations of attorneys whose
candidacies seemed to be premised more on political considerations than on ability. 115 The Democrats forced that issue
when the President nominated Manion. They argued that the
lawyer's mediocre record as a practicing attorney meant that he
was chosen principally for his sterling conservative credentials. 116 After a bitter nomination fight, the Senate confirmed
Manion by the narrowest possible margin; Vice-President Bush
voted to break a tie. 117 The Democrats, however, clearly indicated that they would consider as unacceptable future nominations which were primarily motivated by ideological factors.

C. Resolution
In short, the Clinton administration could treat merit and
balance as significant goals. Several propositions above show
that diversity and political balance have important intrinsic
value. For example, the public has greater respect for, and

and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, A Court of Mediocrity, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1991, at 74;
see also O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 62 (statement of Professor Philip Kurland);
Thomas: The Least Qualified Nominee So Far?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 1991, at 5; cf.
Tom Wicker, A Court of Mediocrity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991, at A17 (liberal observer).
114. I rely substantially here on conversations with Mark Gitenstein [hereinafter Conversations], who was minority counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee at
the time, and Philip Shenon, Senate Ending Judicial Fight, Giues Manion Final
Approval, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1986, at Al. See also NOMINATION OF DANIEL A.
MANION, S. EXEC. REP. No. 16, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter MANION
REPORT]. See generally Larry W. Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69
B.U. L. REV. 273, 305-16 (1989).
115. See Shenon, supra note 114 (discussing Manion's limited federal court
experience); Gitenstein conversations, supra note 114.
116. See Shenon, supra note 114 (Manion's father was founder of the John
Birch Society); see also MANION REPORT, supra note 114; Tobias, supra note 1, at
183.
117. See Shenon, supra note 114.
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confidence in, a federal judiciary whose constitution closely
reflects society's gender and racial composition and political
views. 118 Therefore, the dearth of African-American judges
named by the Republican Presidents might lead President
Clinton to place numerous African-Americans on the bench,
even if other attorneys have superior qualifications. 119 The
Republicans' practically wholehearted pursuit of conservatism
in selecting federal judges could similarly support Democratic
attempts to name equally liberal appointees. 120 Although the
new administration may be tempted to follow, and could justify,
this approach, its adoption would be inadvisable, principally
because President Clinton can simultaneously achieve merit
and balance. 121
An important reason for this compatibility is that a substantial, extremely well-qualified pool of female and minority
lawyers now exists. A number of these attorneys have been
actively involved in very rigorous types of legal activity, some
of which may be less traditional than practice in large law
firms, that effectively requires many attorneys to become administrators.122 Certain forms of lawyering, such as conducting high-impact voting rights litigation for the NAACP, or environmental litigation for the Sierra Club, working in the offices
of federal public defenders or United States attorneys, or writing trenchant scholarship on the federal courts, could better
equip lawyers to be excellent judges. 123

118. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
119. I obviously use the last clause for rhetorical purposes. See also supra note
12 and accompanying text.
120. Indeed, the judicial appointments policy pursued, and the judges named,
over three terms by Presidents Reagan and Bush might enable the new administration to support such clearly partisan premises for appointment as liberalism and
the cultivation of the Democratic Party's liberal wing, although it ordinarily would
be no more appropriate for Democrats than for Republicans to appoint judges primarily on these bases.
121. See supra note 99.
122. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
123. Working in a United States Attorney's Office might be preferable experience for service on the district bench; writing trenchant scholarship may be preferable for appellate courts. See also supra note 94 and accompanying text. This substantial, well-qualified pool also obviates other difficulties. It enables the administration to minimize the controv·~rsy that surrounds affirmative action and quotas.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFffiMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991). The pool also permits the administration to avoid appearing vindictive; the trite formulation is that two wrongs do
not make a right. See Stephen L. Carter, No Krwwn Cure for the Abuse of Power,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1992, § 4, at 17.
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The quality and magnitude of this pool mean that President Clinton need not sacrifice merit for balance. The
administration's effort to name the very best judges may correspondingly warrant some, albeit minimal, compromise in terms
of diversity or political perspectives. For example, the nation
and the courts should not lose the talents of the next Lewis
Powell, Harry Blackmun, or Henry Friendly because such an
appointee would fail to enhance diversity or political balance.124
The stress on merit in choosing judges should lead to concomitant de-emphasis of political considerations, although they
probably cannot be eliminated. 125 Indeed, many aspects of judicial selection are principally political. Attempts to extricate
the process from politics, therefore, may be naive or prove futile. The preferable approach is to recognize and allow for the
political nature of the process, maximizing the beneficial and
minimizing the detrimental effects of politics, and being realistic about the role that politics plays. 126
III.

PROCEDURES FOR ACHIEVING GoALS

The new administration can attain merit and balance in
numerous ways. President Clinton and his advisers responsible
for recruiting judges should first clearly articulate the
administration's philosophy of, and procedures for, judicial
selection. The President ought to provide this guidance in an
executive order, because formal promulgation would afford
notice, clarity, and regularity, which will be important to securing compliance, fostering cooperation of participants involved in
selection, and increasing public confidence in the process. 127

A. Administration Personnel Responsible for
Judicial Selection ·
The capabilities of the administration officials who recruit
judges will be as significant as the specific procedures ultimate-

124. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 564-65 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (Justice Stevens' tribute to Judge Friendly); Sandra Day O'Connor, A
Tribute to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV. 395 (1987).
125. I am indebted to Mark Gitenstein for most of the ideas in this paragraph.
See also Stephen L. Carter, Let's Fess Up to What's Been Going On, LEGAL TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1992, at 27. See generally GITENSTEIN, supra note 1.
126. See supra note 93 and accompanying text; infra note 132.
127. See supra notes 8, 10, 37-38 and accompanying text.
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ly employed. 128 For instance, those officers' competence will
have greater importance than whether the White House or the
Department of Justice assumes primary responsibility in selecting judges. 129 They must exercise good judgment and know
how to recognize merit and distinguish it from political factors.
The persons should be conciliators who can work effectively
with all participants in the selection process. The officials must
also be willing to invoke the requisite authority to protect zealously the process' integrity by countering any activity which
jeopardizes it. These threats could emanate from a plethora of
sectors, such as other administration personnel who may wish
to apply litmus tests, special interest groups that might seek to
veto nominees, or senators who may favor the nomination of
their political supporters. Moreover, the officials should have
the complete confidence of the President. If the officers possess
these attributes, they can recruit highly qualified judges. 130
B.

Suggested Procedures for Assembling Candidates

The individuals responsible for selection must diligently
seek out, find, and advocate candidates of the finest caliber.
Each time President Clinton prepares to fill a judgeship, administration officials must assemble the best pool of potential
candidates, drawn from a broad spectrum of lawyers. The officers ought to enlist the assistance of rather traditional sources,
such as state and local bar associations.
Throughout the process, the officials must work closely
with senators who represent the geographic areas in which
judges are to sit, because senatorial help and cooperation will
facilitate selection. The senators will undoubtedly be active

128. This is especially true in light of other suggestions and certain assumptions made here. For example, given the roles envisioned for senators and the
assumption that lower court confirmation proceedings will continue to lack substance, the abilities of administration officials will have compelling significance. See
supra note 93 and accompanying text; infra note 132.
129. See GITENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 69-73, 82-87, 205-06 (describing problematic relationships between White House and Justice Department in Bork proceedings); see also supra notes 42, 4~' -50 and accompanying text.
130. The procedures attempt to strike appropriate balances among numerous
considerations relevant to judicial selection. An important example is how open the
process should be. It is difficult to quarrel with a process that maximizes openness,
which might mean that many individuals should search for candidates. Nonetheless, more participants could be less effective because, for instance, they could
politicize the process earlier and eliminate excellent candidates. In short, efficacious
selection warrants some compromise in terms of openness.
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participants, although the precise form of their involvement,
which could range from suggesting candidates to vetoing attorneys whom the administration proposes, will depend on numerous variables that arise in specific situations. 131 The variables
might include whether vacancies are in circuit courts which
typically encompass multi-state regions, or district courts within one state; the particular senator's party affiliation; familiarity with individual candidates; and relationships with the administration, the other senators who represent the relevant
regions, and members of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 132
Administration officials should confer with additional
sources when gathering the names of possible candidates. They
ought to contact persons and groups that can suggest highly
qualified lawyers whom traditional sources may not Im.ow because the attorneys engage in less traditional forms of legal endeavors. 133 Examples are individuals or representatives of organizations, such as women's groups, who served on the nominating commissions that proved so effective in recruiting female and minority candidates during the Carter administration.134
131. Cf. Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to Party Joinder,
65 N.C. L. REV. 745, 770 (1987) (treating situations comprised of multiple variables); Carl Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: Resolving the Issue
of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative Proceedings,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 906, 955 (1982) (same).
132. The procedures seek to maximize the best and minimize the least desirable aspects of the roles which senators, patronage and senatorial courtesy play in
judicial selection. For instance, the procedures recognize that senators who represent areas in which judgeships must be filled will know many attorneys who would
be excellent judges and call for the senators' active participation; they concomitantly acknowledge that senators might not know highly qualified candidates who have
engaged in less traditional legal work and propose measures to treat this problem.
The procedures also de-emphasize patronage and senatorial courtesy, because they
could undermine merit even while recognizing that senators' cooperation will be
critical to selection. Senators' loss of benefits from reduced reliance on patronage
and senatorial courtesy may be offset, however, by the public perception that very
meritorious judges have been appointed, the administration's devotion of its resources to the effort, and the deflection from senators of adverse publicity that
might attend controversial candidates' nomination. See also Fowler, supra note 1,
at 310-25 (fmding Carter and Reagan administrations more successful in altering
traditional procedures for circuit court nominees).
133. See supra notes 94, 123 and accompanying text.
134. The procedures do not contemplate revitalization of the judicial nominating commissions because the procedures provide many of the panels' benefits with
fewer detriments. The commissions were an effective means of fostering the appointment of highly qualified female and minority judges. Nonetheless, the large
number of participants involved and the more open procedures used may have
impaired the panels' efficacy. Moreover, commission decisions involving membership
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C. Suggestions for Recommending Finalists
1. Narrowing the pool
Once the officers have collected a large pool of potential
candidates, the officials should designate a small number of the
ablest attorneys by employing the indicia of merit enumerated
above. 135 Narrowing the field to relatively few candidates,
ideally less than five, will make the process manageable yet afford sufficient flexibility to meet unanticipated contingencies,
such as last-minute political opposition. The officers probably
should conduct confidential interviews with individuals who
know these lawyers professionally and personally. 136 The sessions would illuminate and refine the merit determination;
afford instructive insigh1ts on candidates' philosophical perspectives, if political balance becomes relevant; and avoid potentially embarrassing revelations. Close communications with senators who represent the area will be critical at this juncture.

2. Consultation
The new administration should informally consult with the
Senate before officially submitting the names of nominees. 137
The administration may want to propose multiple candidates
for each judicial seat and seek the Senate Judiciary
Committee's views of those whom it finds preferable. Consultation honors the Constitution's phrasing, which states that the
President appoints with the advice and consent of the Senate.138 Consultation should correspondingly enhance the
administration's ability to secure consent, as senators will have
and the candidates forwarded W•?re very political. Revival of the commissions, especially in the district courts, would also be time consuming-a difficulty that is compounded in districts that have unfilled judgeships and are currently experiencing
backlogs. Liberals and conservatives agree on certain of these ideas. See, e.g.,
Goldman, supra note 17, at 319-20; Telephone Interview with George Kassouf,
Judicial Selection Project, Alliance for Justice, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 17, 1992)
(similar idea as to Clinton administration). If the new administration deems revitalization appropriate, it should experiment with re-instituting the circuit panels, as
there would need to be fewer of them and fewer judicial vacancies to fill.
135. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
136. They must be sensitive to privacy concerns. Cf. supra note 77 (public
spectacle in Thomas hearings).
137. See GITENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 333-46; Strauss & Sunstein, supra note
1, at 1518. But see William B. iReynolds, The Confirmation Process: Too Much Advice and Too Little Consent, 75 JUDICATURE 80 (1991).
138. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See generally Mathias, supra note 1; Miner, supra note 55.
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actively participated in considering candidates. Moreover, consultation is rather easy to accomplish and would minimize the
possibility that nominees will prove controversial. 139
The administration should concomitantly maintain open
communications with Republican senators, even if it does not
formally consult. This could facilitate confirmation and might
repair relations that were frayed during the confirmation of
Justice Clarence Thomas. 140 It may help resolve questions regarding the scope of legitimate inquiry in probing nominees,
such as whether senators can insist that nominees answer
queries about their political or judicial philosophies. 141 Democratic senators should extend courtesies to Senate Republicans
like those that the Grand Old Party afforded Democrats between 1980 and 1986 when Republicans controlled the White
House and Senate. 142

3. ABA participation
The administration and the Senate must seek the valuable
assistance of the ABA Standing Committee on Judiciary as the
process nears completion. That entity should continue to discharge the responsibility for advising the Senate on candidates'
qualifications which it has performed so capably for nearly a
half-century. 143 Some observers have criticized the committee
for relying too substantially on certain types of practice experience, and for being overly political when evaluating nominees. 144 The committee should be responsive to · these concerns, although its input has essentially been helpful.

139. The Clinton administration, therefore, should consult, although it has less
need to do so than when different political parties control the Executive Branch
and the Senate. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. The cordial relations which Senator Joseph Biden, the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
enjoys with Senator Orrin Hatch, the ranking minority member, means that committee processing of nominees should proceed rather smoothly.
140. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
141. This has been a particularly controversial issue. See also Chemerinsky,
supra note 73, at 1503-06; supra notes 56-58, 71-77 and accompanying text. Compare Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. REV.
672, 687 (1989) with Albert P. Melone, The Senate's Confirmation Role in Supreme
Court Nominations and the Politics of Ideology Versus Impartiality, 75 JUDICATURE
68 (1991).
142. See supra notes 54-55, 139 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Laurence H. Silberman, The American Bar Association and Judicial Nominations, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1092 (1992); The Candidates Respond,
supra note 78, at 56; supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The inauguration of President Clinton, who will appoint at
least three hundred Article III judges during the next four
years, offers a valuable opportunity to reexamine the process of
federal judicial selection. The Clinton administration should
follow the suggestions afforded above in choosing these judges.
If President Clinton implements this guidance, he will be able
to appoint excellent judges and enhance public confidence in
the process. 145

145. When this Article was in press, the Clinton administration concluded its
first year of judicial selection. During that year, President Clinton nominated fortyeight individuals for positions on the federal bench; of those forty-eight, eighteen
were women (37.5%) and thirteen were minorities (27.2%). Twenty-eight of the
nominees have been confirmed; of those twenty-eight, eleven are women (39.3%)
and seven are minorities (25%). Telephone Interview with George Kassouf, Alliance
for Justice, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 4, 1994).

